I had a thought about one aspect of the abortion debate. It addresses the narrow question of whether a person should feel more uncomfortable about a woman having an early-stage abortion (say two months) than using contraception. I suggest that some reasons for this discomfort might not be valid.
What are the differences between contraception and abortion? They are both means of preventing a baby from being born. Assume that we are discussing a barrier method of contraception. In what I will call the gamete case, a bunch of sperm and an egg are kept apart, but if allowed to come into contact they might produce an embryo that would grow into a baby. In the other case the embryo already exists. What makes the embryo more worthy of protection?
One possible argument is that the embryo will result in a baby but the gamete case probably won't. But neither is certain to produce a baby. The embryo has about a 90% chance of turning into a baby (the spontaneous abortion rate is around 10%). If we assume the most favorable gamete case, a reasonable guess is at least 30%. It is not a large difference in the realm of moral reasoning, and I have never heard of anyone whose discomfort with contraception increased with the likelihood that a pregnancy would otherwise result.
Another possibility is that a large part of the potential baby's future nature is determined in the embryo case but not the gamete case, because its genetic makeup is complete. (Note that the half of the genetic material from the mother has already been specified in the gamete case too). The genetic blueprint for the potential baby has been determined -- but no one knows what it is. Here I think an analogy is useful. Suppose there is a national lottery, and one million people have bought tickets for $10 each. Before the drawing, the Supreme Court rules it illegal, and everyone gets their $10 back. No one has much cause for complaint. Suppose on the other hand that the drawing is to be done in two stages, one to determine the city of the winner and the other to determine the individual. The first part of the drawing has been done, but no one has looked at the result and that information is about to be destroyed. I doubt there would be any serious complaint then either. I use the two-stage drawing to account for the fact that a person's nature is determined by far more than their genetics. If the drawing has already been completed and Frank Jones of Cleveland has been on the news discussing how he will spend his winnings, many people would feel that is not fair, but that is a different case.
Another reason that abortion might cause more discomfort is because in that case a symbiotic relationship between mother and embryo has started to develop. People might learn whether this reason affects them by considering how much discomfort they feel about the destruction of extra embryos created in vitro as part of fertility treatments.
There are other reasons a person might feel an early-stage embryo is worthy of more protection, perhaps because thinking that it will feel pain, or that it has started to look a little like a person, or it has been endowed with an immortal soul. I won't address those.
There are many people who view abortion as murder, and some who feel so strongly about it that it becomes the focus of their lives. There is a natural tendency for pro-choice people to try to meet them halfway. I think that is sensible as it pertains to policy, but I think it also may lead people to inappropriately modify their own personal beliefs.
Friday, December 19, 2008
Sunday, September 7, 2008
Failure to detect aliens does not mean we are doomed to destroy ourselves
I wrote previously (http://bartfusn.blogspot.com/2008/06/aliens-are-bountiful-but-unreachable.html) on the subject of extraterrestrial intelligence. I recently found the issue discussed in my daughter's college astronomy textbook. I expected a textbook to have more precise thinking, but I was disappointed.
Starting on p754 of The Cosmic Perspective, by Bennett et al, 5th edition.:
If the judgment that interstellar travel is effectively impossible is correct, no other explanation is needed as to why the aliens are not here.
Continuing:
The two alternative explanations lack the aura of inevitability. If there are millions of civilizations, the highly unlikely isn't going to account for the failure of all of them -- only the impossible will do. Why would we think that self-destruction is inevitable? Even if there are strong forces leading towards that outcome, there are plenty of opportunities for things to be slightly different: some variation in intelligent species' psychology or sociology, or local ecologies, or local geology. It's hard for me to see why a desire to explore would peter out most of the time, and far harder to believe it would happen in all cases.
We don't have any realistic hope of colonizing the galaxy. But there is room to hope for a long future right here on earth. We might in one way or another come up with a civilization in balance with nature, probably with fewer people than we have now. It might embody a high standard of living, social justice, and intellectual and artistic accomplishments which constitute progress over what we have today. Perhaps such a civilization would view an attempt at interstellar colonization as we today view an attempt to jump across the English Channel carrying bricks (http://montypython.50webs.com/scripts/Series_1/67.htm.) Maybe a harmonious and pleasant future stretching millions of years into the future is incredibly unlikely. But the absence of aliens doesn't figure in that discussion.
Perhaps we should interpret "If thousands of civilizations before us have all failed to achieve interstellar travel on a large scale, what hope do we have?" differently. Perhaps the author assumes interstellar travel is so important that failure to achieve it is equivalent to catastrophic failure of the entire civilization. That is a very narrow set of values that would be foreign to most people.
The absence of aliens or evidence of past alien visits implies that we will not engage in exponential colonization. That's all.
That is an intriguing possibility. A common theme in arguments about other planets, life forms, and civilizations is that what happens on any planet has no effect on what happens on any other one. We have millions of independent observations, as a scientist might put it. Once we assume easy space travel, the independence assumption disappears. The dominant one can influence events on other planets, and the galactic civilization could in statistical terms be a single data point. If its values call for not revealing itself, maybe that is why we aren't detecting aliens.
But as mundane and uninspiring as it may be, my educated guess is that you simply can't (economically) get there from here.
Starting on p754 of The Cosmic Perspective, by Bennett et al, 5th edition.:
That is by far the most likely possibility. The book earlier sketched the enormous difficulties to interstellar travel imposed by the laws of physics. But in this section it just blithely assumes it will be possible some day. I suspect I know why. Frequently a history of a marvelous technology begins with a quote from some learned person in the past who said it could never happen. We implicitly condemn this person as being closed-minded and insufficiently imaginative. No scientist wants to be cited in the future in such a fashion. There are countless times scientists have claimed that something is impossible, and it in fact turns out to be impossible (faster-than-light travel, practical alchemy, perpetual motion machines), but they do not give rise to quotes that fit into historical narratives.This paradox [of why we have not met any aliens] has many possible solutions but broadly speaking we can group them into three categories:
1. We are alone.
2. Civilizations are common, but no one has colonized the galaxy. There are at least three possible reasons why this might be the case. Perhaps interstellar travel is much harder or vastly more expensive than we have guessed, and civilizations are unable to venture far from their home worlds.
If the judgment that interstellar travel is effectively impossible is correct, no other explanation is needed as to why the aliens are not here.
Continuing:
Perhaps the desire to explore is unusual, and other societies either never leave their home star systems or stop exploring before they've colonized much of the galaxy. Most ominously, perhaps many civilizations have arisen, but they have all destroyed themselves before achieving the ability to colonize the stars.
...
[This] category of solutions has ... terrifying implications. If thousands of civilizations before us have all failed to achieve interstellar travel on a large scale, what hope do we have? Unless we somehow think differently than all other civilizations, this solution says that we will never go far in space. Because we have always explored when the opportunity arose, this solution almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that failure will come about because we destroy ourselves.
The two alternative explanations lack the aura of inevitability. If there are millions of civilizations, the highly unlikely isn't going to account for the failure of all of them -- only the impossible will do. Why would we think that self-destruction is inevitable? Even if there are strong forces leading towards that outcome, there are plenty of opportunities for things to be slightly different: some variation in intelligent species' psychology or sociology, or local ecologies, or local geology. It's hard for me to see why a desire to explore would peter out most of the time, and far harder to believe it would happen in all cases.
We don't have any realistic hope of colonizing the galaxy. But there is room to hope for a long future right here on earth. We might in one way or another come up with a civilization in balance with nature, probably with fewer people than we have now. It might embody a high standard of living, social justice, and intellectual and artistic accomplishments which constitute progress over what we have today. Perhaps such a civilization would view an attempt at interstellar colonization as we today view an attempt to jump across the English Channel carrying bricks (http://montypython.50webs.com/scripts/Series_1/67.htm.) Maybe a harmonious and pleasant future stretching millions of years into the future is incredibly unlikely. But the absence of aliens doesn't figure in that discussion.
Perhaps we should interpret "If thousands of civilizations before us have all failed to achieve interstellar travel on a large scale, what hope do we have?" differently. Perhaps the author assumes interstellar travel is so important that failure to achieve it is equivalent to catastrophic failure of the entire civilization. That is a very narrow set of values that would be foreign to most people.
The absence of aliens or evidence of past alien visits implies that we will not engage in exponential colonization. That's all.
3. There is a galactic civilization, but it has not yet revealed its existence to us.
That is an intriguing possibility. A common theme in arguments about other planets, life forms, and civilizations is that what happens on any planet has no effect on what happens on any other one. We have millions of independent observations, as a scientist might put it. Once we assume easy space travel, the independence assumption disappears. The dominant one can influence events on other planets, and the galactic civilization could in statistical terms be a single data point. If its values call for not revealing itself, maybe that is why we aren't detecting aliens.
But as mundane and uninspiring as it may be, my educated guess is that you simply can't (economically) get there from here.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Evolution explains why happiness is elusive
Happiness is what we strive for. We imagine that if we get what we want, we will be happier -- permanently. But psychology has determined that for the most part people's happiness level gradually adapts to changed circumstances. People think that if they can buy the bigger house or make more money they will be happier, but if they achieve their goal, within months they will take that into account and report themselves no happier than before. Similarly, people may feel that losing a job or being forced to give up a home will make them miserable, but once again they take that into account before too long and report themselves just as happy as before.
Can evolution shed light on this state of affairs?
The evolutionary advantage to pleasure or happiness does not come in the moment it is experienced, but in anticipation. When we consider alternative courses of action, we prefer the actions that will bring us to happier futures. The things that bring us happiness are (or were in the environment we evolved in) conducive to reproductive success, such as eating better, being safer and more comfortable, having higher status, and of course sex.
Now, our sensory systems are based on habituation. If we come into a room with a distinctive smell, we will soon get accustomed to it and only experience new smells. If we go from sunlight into a dark cave, our visual system adapts so that what was dim before will seem very bright. This makes sense, since our senses benefit us by getting new information, and whatever is a constant background does not convey information any more. We could imagine an organism wired so that it always experiences sunlight as very bright but can make small distinctions among what looks very bright, as well as seeing dark areas as very dark but able to make small distinctions in what seems very dark. But for whatever reason we are not wired that way. From that perspective, it is not surprising that we also habituate to happiness.
If the average outcome for a man in our environment of evolution is to have one mate, he could imagine himself happier having two or three and less happy if he had none. But if he does have three mates, evolution has no desire in having him rest content there -- it is very much to the advantage of his genes if he can have four or five mates*. Similarly, if he has no mate at all, a permanent funk is not adaptive -- contributing to the success of nephews and nieces might be his new standard of happiness. (The situation with women is somewhat more complicated). Both sexes could also recalibrate in other aspects of their lives. For instance, improving a very poor diet to a merely poor one would bring happiness, but it is advantageous to recalibrate and then go on to seek a rich diet or a very rich one.
It is also to our evolutionary advantage to not easily understand our recalibration of happiness. If we did, it would undercut the motivation we get from bettering our current condition, whatever it may be.
There are ways to be happier at any given level of life circumstances by meditation, exercise, and thinking about things differently, but I imagine these were not relevant in the environment we evolved in.
-----
*This is not a defense of polygamy or philandering. We can and should and usually do transcend such innate inclinations.
Can evolution shed light on this state of affairs?
The evolutionary advantage to pleasure or happiness does not come in the moment it is experienced, but in anticipation. When we consider alternative courses of action, we prefer the actions that will bring us to happier futures. The things that bring us happiness are (or were in the environment we evolved in) conducive to reproductive success, such as eating better, being safer and more comfortable, having higher status, and of course sex.
Now, our sensory systems are based on habituation. If we come into a room with a distinctive smell, we will soon get accustomed to it and only experience new smells. If we go from sunlight into a dark cave, our visual system adapts so that what was dim before will seem very bright. This makes sense, since our senses benefit us by getting new information, and whatever is a constant background does not convey information any more. We could imagine an organism wired so that it always experiences sunlight as very bright but can make small distinctions among what looks very bright, as well as seeing dark areas as very dark but able to make small distinctions in what seems very dark. But for whatever reason we are not wired that way. From that perspective, it is not surprising that we also habituate to happiness.
If the average outcome for a man in our environment of evolution is to have one mate, he could imagine himself happier having two or three and less happy if he had none. But if he does have three mates, evolution has no desire in having him rest content there -- it is very much to the advantage of his genes if he can have four or five mates*. Similarly, if he has no mate at all, a permanent funk is not adaptive -- contributing to the success of nephews and nieces might be his new standard of happiness. (The situation with women is somewhat more complicated). Both sexes could also recalibrate in other aspects of their lives. For instance, improving a very poor diet to a merely poor one would bring happiness, but it is advantageous to recalibrate and then go on to seek a rich diet or a very rich one.
It is also to our evolutionary advantage to not easily understand our recalibration of happiness. If we did, it would undercut the motivation we get from bettering our current condition, whatever it may be.
There are ways to be happier at any given level of life circumstances by meditation, exercise, and thinking about things differently, but I imagine these were not relevant in the environment we evolved in.
-----
*This is not a defense of polygamy or philandering. We can and should and usually do transcend such innate inclinations.
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
Deciding where to give money
Some of us feel morally compelled to look beyond our own well-being to try to make the world a better place. The variety of needs is far greater than any one person could address. How should a person choose? Donations of time and labor can be very valuable, but to simplify the question, I will discuss only the aspect of financial donations, since there is some organization that will accept checks to address just about any issue. I recognize that many of us do not have the means to give much money away; not all of us have the luxury of confronting this issue.
I exclude from consideration donations made for a service received, even though the payment is not required. This could include the "suggested donation" at a concert, giving to a public radio station because one enjoys the programming, or giving to one's religious organization. Some of us have money to give for which we get only the most indirect return, such as feeling we have done a good thing.
One general approach to giving is what I might call reactive. We consider the issues that come to our attention while we are doing other things. We give to what our friends and neighbors are giving to. We respond to mailings asking for help. We give to help the victims of disasters we see on TV news.
Another approach might be called inner-directed. We would consider what within ourselves we value most and find ways to give money to carry forward those values. We would not give to organizations that sent the most numerous and most eloquent fundraising letters. We might not give to what our friends give to if, on reflection, it isn't so important to us.
A cerebral version of this might be to first allocate a fixed amount of money and then divide it according to our values. That is my tendency.
A more emotional approach can be reactive but it can also be inner-directed if we make a point of not making decisions when biased by immediate exposure to a particular cause.
It is hard to write much about where feelings lead us -- people's feelings are individual and personal. Strong feelings could lead us to dig into money we would have spent on ourselves.
So, returning to the cerebral side, how could we decide?
One consideration might be giving as part of a community effort. If someone asks to be sponsored for a "Walk For X", giving to that cause is part of a social relationship with the person.
Another way to decide would be to find the greatest need. This might lead us to send all our discretionary money to Africa. Though some moral philosophers might look down on us, I think for most of us there is an irresistible tendency to want to give to causes we identify with personally and people who are more like us.
It is surely natural to give to blood relations, especially our children. This is so strongly ingrained that to me it falls more in the category of money spent personally than for the greater good.
The categories and dimensions we might use for determining who is worthy of our money are certainly numerous: geography, language, race, religion, nationality, social class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic heritage, intimate experience with any particular disease, interest (such as a hobby), educational institution, or species (humanity). There is an interesting complication, however: When we fall on the privileged side of any categorization of people, there is a tension between giving to people like ourselves and giving to those more in need. For instance, a person with a home might give to the homeless (different) but to the homeless of the US rather than other countries (same).
Some causes are not linked directly to particular people. Preservation of nature and the environment is in this category, and historical preservation to some extent.
Another dimension is short-term relief as opposed to longer-term. Feeding people at a homeless shelter is shorter-term, while working for affordable housing is longer-term.
There is a tradeoff between spreading money across many organizations or giving more to a few. Limiting the organizations saves overhead costs and reduces somewhat the flood of fundraising letters. On the other hand, one way used for gauging the strength of an organization is how many people contribute to it, not just the total value of the contributions.
I have little to say about where these criteria lead me. I find it a hard problem. But I present the framework for wider consideration. Perhaps other people have other ways of thinking about it.
I exclude from consideration donations made for a service received, even though the payment is not required. This could include the "suggested donation" at a concert, giving to a public radio station because one enjoys the programming, or giving to one's religious organization. Some of us have money to give for which we get only the most indirect return, such as feeling we have done a good thing.
One general approach to giving is what I might call reactive. We consider the issues that come to our attention while we are doing other things. We give to what our friends and neighbors are giving to. We respond to mailings asking for help. We give to help the victims of disasters we see on TV news.
Another approach might be called inner-directed. We would consider what within ourselves we value most and find ways to give money to carry forward those values. We would not give to organizations that sent the most numerous and most eloquent fundraising letters. We might not give to what our friends give to if, on reflection, it isn't so important to us.
A cerebral version of this might be to first allocate a fixed amount of money and then divide it according to our values. That is my tendency.
A more emotional approach can be reactive but it can also be inner-directed if we make a point of not making decisions when biased by immediate exposure to a particular cause.
It is hard to write much about where feelings lead us -- people's feelings are individual and personal. Strong feelings could lead us to dig into money we would have spent on ourselves.
So, returning to the cerebral side, how could we decide?
One consideration might be giving as part of a community effort. If someone asks to be sponsored for a "Walk For X", giving to that cause is part of a social relationship with the person.
Another way to decide would be to find the greatest need. This might lead us to send all our discretionary money to Africa. Though some moral philosophers might look down on us, I think for most of us there is an irresistible tendency to want to give to causes we identify with personally and people who are more like us.
It is surely natural to give to blood relations, especially our children. This is so strongly ingrained that to me it falls more in the category of money spent personally than for the greater good.
The categories and dimensions we might use for determining who is worthy of our money are certainly numerous: geography, language, race, religion, nationality, social class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic heritage, intimate experience with any particular disease, interest (such as a hobby), educational institution, or species (humanity). There is an interesting complication, however: When we fall on the privileged side of any categorization of people, there is a tension between giving to people like ourselves and giving to those more in need. For instance, a person with a home might give to the homeless (different) but to the homeless of the US rather than other countries (same).
Some causes are not linked directly to particular people. Preservation of nature and the environment is in this category, and historical preservation to some extent.
Another dimension is short-term relief as opposed to longer-term. Feeding people at a homeless shelter is shorter-term, while working for affordable housing is longer-term.
There is a tradeoff between spreading money across many organizations or giving more to a few. Limiting the organizations saves overhead costs and reduces somewhat the flood of fundraising letters. On the other hand, one way used for gauging the strength of an organization is how many people contribute to it, not just the total value of the contributions.
I have little to say about where these criteria lead me. I find it a hard problem. But I present the framework for wider consideration. Perhaps other people have other ways of thinking about it.
Sunday, June 22, 2008
Calling for an "I'm sorry" handsign
I think someone needs to invent a handsign, most urgently for use by drivers.
There are many signs we already have available:
The finger. Needs no comment.
Raising hand. Acknowledgment of someone who has yielded right of way.
Thumbs up. Approval.
Thumbs down. Disapproval.
Fluttering flat hand. Ambivalence.
Thumb and finger in a circle with others wide (finger spelling "f"): Perfect.
Waving "hi". Generic friendly gesture.
Peace sign. Nearly as generic friendly gesture.
What about a sign that says "I am sorry, I apologize"? I have sometimes wished I had such a sign when I inadvertently make a mistake while driving. In response to a horn blast, waving "hi" or the peace sign or thumbs up can indicate friendly intentions, but they can also be interpreted as dismissal of the situation, as in "Don't have a cow, man". Even if few drivers ever gave the "I'm sorry" signal, it still might have a noticeable effect. Occasional validation could quiet the sort of person who might go over the edge to road rage.
There are some possibilities, but none is a simple hand sign and all are hard to observe: A facial wince or mouthing the words "I'm sorry" could serve the purpose, as could scrunching one's head down to convey the "guilty" concept. Putting palm to forehead as in "doh!" might serve but is also lacking in visibility.
There are many signs we already have available:
The finger. Needs no comment.
Raising hand. Acknowledgment of someone who has yielded right of way.
Thumbs up. Approval.
Thumbs down. Disapproval.
Fluttering flat hand. Ambivalence.
Thumb and finger in a circle with others wide (finger spelling "f"): Perfect.
Waving "hi". Generic friendly gesture.
Peace sign. Nearly as generic friendly gesture.
What about a sign that says "I am sorry, I apologize"? I have sometimes wished I had such a sign when I inadvertently make a mistake while driving. In response to a horn blast, waving "hi" or the peace sign or thumbs up can indicate friendly intentions, but they can also be interpreted as dismissal of the situation, as in "Don't have a cow, man". Even if few drivers ever gave the "I'm sorry" signal, it still might have a noticeable effect. Occasional validation could quiet the sort of person who might go over the edge to road rage.
There are some possibilities, but none is a simple hand sign and all are hard to observe: A facial wince or mouthing the words "I'm sorry" could serve the purpose, as could scrunching one's head down to convey the "guilty" concept. Putting palm to forehead as in "doh!" might serve but is also lacking in visibility.
Saturday, June 14, 2008
Aliens are bountiful but unreachable
It is common to wonder about whether there are intelligent civilizations elsewhere in the universe, and if so, why we haven't heard from them. Here is one link that discusses the issue:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermi_paradox
Here is how I see it:
It is overwhelmingly likely that intelligent life has arisen elsewhere in the universe millions of times. We believe we are on an average star in an average galaxy, with nothing from the realm of astronomy indicating we are special. Any time in the past we have considered ourselves to be special, we have been wrong (our culture fundamentally greater than other cultures, our species fundamentally different from other species, our planet the center of the universe). Among gazillions of possible stars and planets, it is conservative to estimate millions of instances of intelligent life.
The failure to detect such other civilizations casts no doubt on this conclusion. Of all the possibilities that have been put forth for why we have not detected aliens, one observation suffices: Relative to the density and longevity of technological civilizations, the laws of physics prevent economically feasible ways of moving among the stars.
If there were a truly easy way of moving among the stars as simple as some sort of instantaneous jump from one point to another, some one of the millions of other civilizations would have discovered it and taken advantage of it. They would be here already. If the effort required were substantial, then it would be less likely and depend heavily on how dense civilizations are.
Those who are sanguine about the possibilities of interstellar exploration and colonization remind us that our world is full of technological marvels that earlier generations could not have predicted. They are correct that we should not rule out interstellar-enabling technologies based on what we understand of science and technology today. But it would be a worse folly to claim that it is only our limited mindset that makes us doubt the discovery of every technology we find appealing. We cannot say that any future technology that excites our imagination is impossible, but we certainly cannot say that it is inevitable. The persuasive evidence that easy interstellar travel cannot be achieved is that none of the millions of other civilizations has achieved it.
Life on earth has a tendency to spread into all available niches, and people reasonably expect that the same process would apply to the colonization of space. If we assume humans discovered the requisite technology, exponential expansion requires the discovery of planets that not only can support human life but where it can thrive to the point of serving as a basis for a further round of exploration and colonization. Planets that would allow human life to thrive might be considerably less common than planets with other intelligent life forms, which might evolve in considerably different environments. Human-friendly planets might also be inhabited by civilizations that, whatever their initial friendliness, would not be so friendly to the idea of being colonized, and could use their huge advantages in local resources to prevent it.
Detecting an alien presence in the electromagnetic spectrum seems much more likely. It is a function of how dense intelligent life is in the universe, how long it lasts in a detectable form, and how sensitive our detection technologies are. Failure to detect other civilizations will not cast doubt on their existence. As our technologies increase and we find no aliens, our estimate of the density of life in the universe will simply go down.
It is overwhelmingly likely that intelligent life abounds elsewhere in the universe, and overwhelmingly unlikely that we will ever communicate with any of it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermi_paradox
Here is how I see it:
It is overwhelmingly likely that intelligent life has arisen elsewhere in the universe millions of times. We believe we are on an average star in an average galaxy, with nothing from the realm of astronomy indicating we are special. Any time in the past we have considered ourselves to be special, we have been wrong (our culture fundamentally greater than other cultures, our species fundamentally different from other species, our planet the center of the universe). Among gazillions of possible stars and planets, it is conservative to estimate millions of instances of intelligent life.
The failure to detect such other civilizations casts no doubt on this conclusion. Of all the possibilities that have been put forth for why we have not detected aliens, one observation suffices: Relative to the density and longevity of technological civilizations, the laws of physics prevent economically feasible ways of moving among the stars.
If there were a truly easy way of moving among the stars as simple as some sort of instantaneous jump from one point to another, some one of the millions of other civilizations would have discovered it and taken advantage of it. They would be here already. If the effort required were substantial, then it would be less likely and depend heavily on how dense civilizations are.
Those who are sanguine about the possibilities of interstellar exploration and colonization remind us that our world is full of technological marvels that earlier generations could not have predicted. They are correct that we should not rule out interstellar-enabling technologies based on what we understand of science and technology today. But it would be a worse folly to claim that it is only our limited mindset that makes us doubt the discovery of every technology we find appealing. We cannot say that any future technology that excites our imagination is impossible, but we certainly cannot say that it is inevitable. The persuasive evidence that easy interstellar travel cannot be achieved is that none of the millions of other civilizations has achieved it.
Life on earth has a tendency to spread into all available niches, and people reasonably expect that the same process would apply to the colonization of space. If we assume humans discovered the requisite technology, exponential expansion requires the discovery of planets that not only can support human life but where it can thrive to the point of serving as a basis for a further round of exploration and colonization. Planets that would allow human life to thrive might be considerably less common than planets with other intelligent life forms, which might evolve in considerably different environments. Human-friendly planets might also be inhabited by civilizations that, whatever their initial friendliness, would not be so friendly to the idea of being colonized, and could use their huge advantages in local resources to prevent it.
Detecting an alien presence in the electromagnetic spectrum seems much more likely. It is a function of how dense intelligent life is in the universe, how long it lasts in a detectable form, and how sensitive our detection technologies are. Failure to detect other civilizations will not cast doubt on their existence. As our technologies increase and we find no aliens, our estimate of the density of life in the universe will simply go down.
It is overwhelmingly likely that intelligent life abounds elsewhere in the universe, and overwhelmingly unlikely that we will ever communicate with any of it.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
The missing grandchildren
It has been known for some time that the population in most of the industrialized world is not reproducing sufficiently to replace itself. (The national populations may be growing, but that is due to immigration from the non-industrialized nations.) Almost all children survive to adulthood, but women and men have on average less than one child each (the demographers always measure this as children per woman, not children per person, but that makes a low birthrate sound like women's fault alone, or, if one favors a low birthrate, their accomplishment alone).
Progressive thinkers on the subject of population growth note that when people achieve some measure of security and prosperity, birth rates drop. They have now dropped below replacement rate. One major reason is that as reliable birth control becomes more widely available, people can plan their family size. Why do people want fewer children?
I suggest that one reason is that there are more interesting things to do. As all parents know, children are a source of great joy, but also of great exasperation and drudgery. For the poor where life itself is largely drudgery, the joy might stand out more than some extra drudgery. For those who are better off, life in general is more pleasant. Interesting careers are available to many people -- even ones we consider dull may be far more interesting than back-breaking agricultural labor. Labor-saving devices make housework far less demanding. There is leisure time and vacation time and many interesting ways to spend it. How does parenthood look against that background? At an emotional level, children are just as exasperating as ever, and the need for constant supervision remains the domain of people, not labor-saving devices. Without children, there is far more time for plain old fun, and more money to pay for the fun too. Occasional visits with a niece or nephew can allow a sampling of the fun part of parenthood.
Exacerbating this problem is America's highly child-centered culture. It is the norm for parents to spend as much time with their children each day as other commitments allow, or to drive them to out-of-home enriching experiences. When today's children reach the point of deciding whether or not to have children, what will they recall? They will recall that their parents' lives were consumed by taking care of children, and it may not be a commitment they want to take on.
People growing up in the 1950s or 1960s may remember a childhood where it was up to them to find their own toys and their own amusement. They were on their own after school until supper without parental intervention. The parents were doing their own activities in the evenings, albeit with occasional interruptions. That allowed far more time for the parents to pursue their own personal pleasures. That version of parenthood may be one that anyone, notably today's young adults, would be more likely to embark on. But it is not an option they can easily choose. If they did, they would be censured for neglecting their children.
It is true that if a person has poor memories of their own childhood, they may not want to have children either. But the main benefits of the child-centered culture to children are in their accomplishments and their safety, not their happiness. I speculate that in moving from 1950s childrearing to 2000s childrearing, parents have lost far more in autonomy than children have gained in happiness.
The counterintuitive result may be that the more effort we put into enriching our children's lives, the less likely we are to have grandchildren.
Progressive thinkers on the subject of population growth note that when people achieve some measure of security and prosperity, birth rates drop. They have now dropped below replacement rate. One major reason is that as reliable birth control becomes more widely available, people can plan their family size. Why do people want fewer children?
I suggest that one reason is that there are more interesting things to do. As all parents know, children are a source of great joy, but also of great exasperation and drudgery. For the poor where life itself is largely drudgery, the joy might stand out more than some extra drudgery. For those who are better off, life in general is more pleasant. Interesting careers are available to many people -- even ones we consider dull may be far more interesting than back-breaking agricultural labor. Labor-saving devices make housework far less demanding. There is leisure time and vacation time and many interesting ways to spend it. How does parenthood look against that background? At an emotional level, children are just as exasperating as ever, and the need for constant supervision remains the domain of people, not labor-saving devices. Without children, there is far more time for plain old fun, and more money to pay for the fun too. Occasional visits with a niece or nephew can allow a sampling of the fun part of parenthood.
Exacerbating this problem is America's highly child-centered culture. It is the norm for parents to spend as much time with their children each day as other commitments allow, or to drive them to out-of-home enriching experiences. When today's children reach the point of deciding whether or not to have children, what will they recall? They will recall that their parents' lives were consumed by taking care of children, and it may not be a commitment they want to take on.
People growing up in the 1950s or 1960s may remember a childhood where it was up to them to find their own toys and their own amusement. They were on their own after school until supper without parental intervention. The parents were doing their own activities in the evenings, albeit with occasional interruptions. That allowed far more time for the parents to pursue their own personal pleasures. That version of parenthood may be one that anyone, notably today's young adults, would be more likely to embark on. But it is not an option they can easily choose. If they did, they would be censured for neglecting their children.
It is true that if a person has poor memories of their own childhood, they may not want to have children either. But the main benefits of the child-centered culture to children are in their accomplishments and their safety, not their happiness. I speculate that in moving from 1950s childrearing to 2000s childrearing, parents have lost far more in autonomy than children have gained in happiness.
The counterintuitive result may be that the more effort we put into enriching our children's lives, the less likely we are to have grandchildren.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Contests of power and contests of discrimination
In World War II, we often knew where the German troops were located, but it was difficult and dangerous and a chancy matter to defeat them. Our power has grown to the point that in the initial stages of the Iraq war, we had no difficulty defeating Saddam Hussein’s armed forces. Any military target we could locate, we could destroy. We had a far more difficult time defeating them once they gave up their tanks and started using far less sophisticated weapons*. The problem has changed from one of a contest of power to a question of discrimination, in the original sense of “telling things apart”. We cannot easily defeat Iraqi fighters because we cannot easily distinguish them from the Iraqi population, which we do not want to destroy. The situation was almost the same in Vietnam.
The same progression has happened with our nonhuman foes. It has been some time since we had a raw contest of power with lions, tigers and bears. We have no trouble defeating them (so little, indeed, that such animals became endangered species). We can exterminate smaller foes such as rats and bugs in our houses, and the main difficulty is how to avoid poisoning the human residents at the same time. In the wild, the problem is how to avoid poisoning the rest of the ecosystem. Our most serious foes today are bacteria and viruses. It is easy enough to destroy them, as we do every time we sterilize medical instruments. The problem is destroying them while preserving the human bodies they live within. The most difficult discrimination problem is cancer, tissue that is so similar to us that it IS us, a small part run amok.
*This is a description of how things are, not how they should be. In writing dispassionately about how to destroy targets in Iraq, I am not addressing directly the question of whether that is a good idea. I do not intend this essay as a prescription for doing anything differently, just perhaps a slightly differently way of looking at things. But this perspective can be brought to bear on various other human conflicts too.
The same progression has happened with our nonhuman foes. It has been some time since we had a raw contest of power with lions, tigers and bears. We have no trouble defeating them (so little, indeed, that such animals became endangered species). We can exterminate smaller foes such as rats and bugs in our houses, and the main difficulty is how to avoid poisoning the human residents at the same time. In the wild, the problem is how to avoid poisoning the rest of the ecosystem. Our most serious foes today are bacteria and viruses. It is easy enough to destroy them, as we do every time we sterilize medical instruments. The problem is destroying them while preserving the human bodies they live within. The most difficult discrimination problem is cancer, tissue that is so similar to us that it IS us, a small part run amok.
*This is a description of how things are, not how they should be. In writing dispassionately about how to destroy targets in Iraq, I am not addressing directly the question of whether that is a good idea. I do not intend this essay as a prescription for doing anything differently, just perhaps a slightly differently way of looking at things. But this perspective can be brought to bear on various other human conflicts too.
Saturday, March 29, 2008
A Darwinian Left
In a previous post to this list about Steven Pinker's "The Blank Slate" I jumped straight to hot-button issues concerning innate differences among humans without laying out his more fundamental observation, which is that we humans have profound innate similarities. I liked this summary by another author of where I think the recognition of innate human nature leaves us:
"We should not:
Deny the existence of human nature, nor insist that human nature is inherently good, nor that it is infinitely malleable.
Expect to end all conflict and strife between human beings, whether by political revolution, social change, or better education.
Assume that all inequalities are due to discrimination, prejudice, oppression or social conditioning. Some will be, but this cannot be assumed in every case.
We should:
Accept that there is such a thing as human nature, and seek to find out more about it, so that policies can be grounded on the best available evidence of what human beings are like.
Reject any inference from what is 'natural' to what is 'right'.
Expect that, under different social and economic systems, many people will act competitively in order to enhance their own status, gain a position of power, and/or advance their interests and those of their kin.
Expect that, regardless of the social and economic system in which they live most people will respond positively to genuine opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.
Promote structures that foster cooperation rather than competition, and attempt to channel competition into socially desirable ends.
Stand by the traditional values of the left by being on the side of the weak, poor and oppressed, but think very carefully about what social and economic changes will really work to benefit them."
I also thought this was apt:
"Wood carvers presented with a piece of timber and a request to make wooden bowls from it do not simply begin carving according to a design drawn up before they have seen the wood. Instead they will examine the material with which they are to work, and modify their design in order to suit its grain. Political philosophers and the revolutionaries or reformers who have followed them have all too often worked out their ideal society, or their reforms, and sought to apply them without knowing much about the human beings who must carry out, and live with, their plans. Then, when the plans don't work, they blame traitors within their ranks, or sinister agents of outside forces, for the failure. Instead, those seeking to reshape society must understand the tendencies inherent in human beings, and modify their abstract ideals to suit them."
The quotes above are from a short book by Peter Singer, "A Darwinian Left" (1999). Although I do not agree with everything he stands for, I thought those passages were excellent.
Adding my own take on one key point, I would note that Darwin and evolutionary science say not one iota about how things ought to be, only about how they are. It's very hard to know the ultimate source of our values and goals; they are the product in some fashion of our culture, our history, our ideas, and our human nature. But it is neither correct nor desirable to give "human nature" any special status in that list. Where "human nature" matters a great deal is when we contemplate transforming our society. It lets us estimate the chances of success in meeting our goals, allowing us to make wise compromises between what we would like and what is possible.
"We should not:
Deny the existence of human nature, nor insist that human nature is inherently good, nor that it is infinitely malleable.
Expect to end all conflict and strife between human beings, whether by political revolution, social change, or better education.
Assume that all inequalities are due to discrimination, prejudice, oppression or social conditioning. Some will be, but this cannot be assumed in every case.
We should:
Accept that there is such a thing as human nature, and seek to find out more about it, so that policies can be grounded on the best available evidence of what human beings are like.
Reject any inference from what is 'natural' to what is 'right'.
Expect that, under different social and economic systems, many people will act competitively in order to enhance their own status, gain a position of power, and/or advance their interests and those of their kin.
Expect that, regardless of the social and economic system in which they live most people will respond positively to genuine opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.
Promote structures that foster cooperation rather than competition, and attempt to channel competition into socially desirable ends.
Stand by the traditional values of the left by being on the side of the weak, poor and oppressed, but think very carefully about what social and economic changes will really work to benefit them."
I also thought this was apt:
"Wood carvers presented with a piece of timber and a request to make wooden bowls from it do not simply begin carving according to a design drawn up before they have seen the wood. Instead they will examine the material with which they are to work, and modify their design in order to suit its grain. Political philosophers and the revolutionaries or reformers who have followed them have all too often worked out their ideal society, or their reforms, and sought to apply them without knowing much about the human beings who must carry out, and live with, their plans. Then, when the plans don't work, they blame traitors within their ranks, or sinister agents of outside forces, for the failure. Instead, those seeking to reshape society must understand the tendencies inherent in human beings, and modify their abstract ideals to suit them."
The quotes above are from a short book by Peter Singer, "A Darwinian Left" (1999). Although I do not agree with everything he stands for, I thought those passages were excellent.
Adding my own take on one key point, I would note that Darwin and evolutionary science say not one iota about how things ought to be, only about how they are. It's very hard to know the ultimate source of our values and goals; they are the product in some fashion of our culture, our history, our ideas, and our human nature. But it is neither correct nor desirable to give "human nature" any special status in that list. Where "human nature" matters a great deal is when we contemplate transforming our society. It lets us estimate the chances of success in meeting our goals, allowing us to make wise compromises between what we would like and what is possible.
Local peace vs Global peace
Over the years I have heard a variety of proposals and strategies for achieving a more peaceful and harmonious world. I have worked for some of them, and I can't think of one I have been opposed to. Yet I find myself with some critical thoughts.
Violence covers a spectrum from what goes on between friends and family, up through larger groups to the question of violence between nations. There is a widespread sense that this constitutes a single thing, an aspect of life that calls for a single approach. Between family and friends, within workplaces, within a group such as FUSN, the proper methods to eliminate violence include personal ones. Adopting a more peaceful inner state is important. Teaching nonviolent conflict resolution, learning about appropriate ways to manage anger, and empathy with others' points of views -- all are important.
But people often say that these transformations are the way to work towards nonviolence in the world of international relations. "Peace: Let it begin with me." "The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step."
I disagree. At the level of national and international politics, these are not what matter. The idea of a Department of Peace perplexes me, and I feel ambivalent about the draft UU proposal: "Should the Unitarian Universalist Association reject the use of any and all kinds of violence and war to resolve disputes between peoples and nations and adopt a principle of seeking just peace through nonviolent means?" Does the journey of a thousand miles begin with a single step? Or are we trying to reach the moon by climbing a mountain?
As I left grad school in 1982, I was deeply concerned about the possibility of war, in particular nuclear war between the US and the USSR. In an attempt to take action, I became impressed with the late Randall Forsberg, and worked for her for three years. Randy was a principal author of the Nuclear Freeze, a movement which swept the nation and forced Reagan to take a more peaceful approach to the USSR than he otherwise would have. Randy was a radical, passionately committed to peace and justice, but the Freeze proposal was very moderate: not to forswear all violence or even military action, but simply to stop building new nuclear weapons if the USSR would agree to do the same. Her genius was to find a moderate first step that ordinary folks could embrace. That's the kind of proposal we need to find. The ordinary person is, I am afraid, left scratching his or her head and looking puzzled at those who want to forswear all violence, now.
The way to international peace is by a series of steps in the real world, the peaceful resolution of one conflict, and then perhaps another. With luck, this will transform the world into a place which Americans perceive as somewhat less dangerous, allowing them to consider a less violent posture or solution to the next crisis. Few Americans like war, they just feel it may be necessary to stay safe.
A personal commitment to a more profound nonviolence is useful for the goal of eliminating the (often fairly subtle) violence within FUSN and our own families, but if intended as a way to international peace, it is mostly a distraction.
Violence covers a spectrum from what goes on between friends and family, up through larger groups to the question of violence between nations. There is a widespread sense that this constitutes a single thing, an aspect of life that calls for a single approach. Between family and friends, within workplaces, within a group such as FUSN, the proper methods to eliminate violence include personal ones. Adopting a more peaceful inner state is important. Teaching nonviolent conflict resolution, learning about appropriate ways to manage anger, and empathy with others' points of views -- all are important.
But people often say that these transformations are the way to work towards nonviolence in the world of international relations. "Peace: Let it begin with me." "The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step."
I disagree. At the level of national and international politics, these are not what matter. The idea of a Department of Peace perplexes me, and I feel ambivalent about the draft UU proposal: "Should the Unitarian Universalist Association reject the use of any and all kinds of violence and war to resolve disputes between peoples and nations and adopt a principle of seeking just peace through nonviolent means?" Does the journey of a thousand miles begin with a single step? Or are we trying to reach the moon by climbing a mountain?
As I left grad school in 1982, I was deeply concerned about the possibility of war, in particular nuclear war between the US and the USSR. In an attempt to take action, I became impressed with the late Randall Forsberg, and worked for her for three years. Randy was a principal author of the Nuclear Freeze, a movement which swept the nation and forced Reagan to take a more peaceful approach to the USSR than he otherwise would have. Randy was a radical, passionately committed to peace and justice, but the Freeze proposal was very moderate: not to forswear all violence or even military action, but simply to stop building new nuclear weapons if the USSR would agree to do the same. Her genius was to find a moderate first step that ordinary folks could embrace. That's the kind of proposal we need to find. The ordinary person is, I am afraid, left scratching his or her head and looking puzzled at those who want to forswear all violence, now.
The way to international peace is by a series of steps in the real world, the peaceful resolution of one conflict, and then perhaps another. With luck, this will transform the world into a place which Americans perceive as somewhat less dangerous, allowing them to consider a less violent posture or solution to the next crisis. Few Americans like war, they just feel it may be necessary to stay safe.
A personal commitment to a more profound nonviolence is useful for the goal of eliminating the (often fairly subtle) violence within FUSN and our own families, but if intended as a way to international peace, it is mostly a distraction.
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Pinker's "The Blank Slate"
I have just read a book by Steve Pinker call "The Blank Slate". It was written in 2002, so it won't be news to people who follow such things. But I find Pinker's observations on our social condition to be some of the most incisive that I have read.
He treats a series of issues that he identifies as "hot buttons" (politics, violence, gender, children, and the arts). There is a great deal more to the book, but I find those parts the most interesting. I am inspired by Pinker's beliefs here, but it is possible that I am not reflecting his opinions in all respects.
He argues that greater consideration should be put on innate differences than is typical in modern culture when addressing social issues. I will take as an example the idea of innate differences in intelligence among people, though the form of the argument is similar for the other hot button issues:
In the conventional liberal view, all children start with equal intelligence, and given the proper environment we could all emerge as highly intelligent. The liberal view is also that people who disagree with that view should be condemned as racists. Their main reason is that in the past, those with morally repugnant views (such as Nazis) alleged innate differences in defense of racist policies. That is (rightly) an emotionally charged issue, which (understandably) can make it hard to move towards looking dispassionately at what the alternative suggestion actually is.
The alternative view starts with science. Nazis made allegations of innate differences without any evidence, and Cyril Burt faked data to defend his belief in the innate superiority of upper class British children. Real science has shown that those were false. But science has also given overwhelming evidence for the heritability of intelligence (more precisely, for a large chunk of the differences in intelligence between individuals within a group).
But Pinker has no patience for morally repugnant policies. He argues that our moral stance should rest on firmer ground: people all have equal value and must have equal rights and opportunities because they are people, not because they have equal (or even "as good") genetic backgrounds.
While I am impressed by Pinker's analyses, I have also learned over the years to be cautious about accepting any view until I have heard and considered the best arguments that people on the other side of the issue have to offer. My initial efforts to find opposing views on the web did not turn up anything I found very impressive, but I am interested in what others may know.
He treats a series of issues that he identifies as "hot buttons" (politics, violence, gender, children, and the arts). There is a great deal more to the book, but I find those parts the most interesting. I am inspired by Pinker's beliefs here, but it is possible that I am not reflecting his opinions in all respects.
He argues that greater consideration should be put on innate differences than is typical in modern culture when addressing social issues. I will take as an example the idea of innate differences in intelligence among people, though the form of the argument is similar for the other hot button issues:
In the conventional liberal view, all children start with equal intelligence, and given the proper environment we could all emerge as highly intelligent. The liberal view is also that people who disagree with that view should be condemned as racists. Their main reason is that in the past, those with morally repugnant views (such as Nazis) alleged innate differences in defense of racist policies. That is (rightly) an emotionally charged issue, which (understandably) can make it hard to move towards looking dispassionately at what the alternative suggestion actually is.
The alternative view starts with science. Nazis made allegations of innate differences without any evidence, and Cyril Burt faked data to defend his belief in the innate superiority of upper class British children. Real science has shown that those were false. But science has also given overwhelming evidence for the heritability of intelligence (more precisely, for a large chunk of the differences in intelligence between individuals within a group).
But Pinker has no patience for morally repugnant policies. He argues that our moral stance should rest on firmer ground: people all have equal value and must have equal rights and opportunities because they are people, not because they have equal (or even "as good") genetic backgrounds.
While I am impressed by Pinker's analyses, I have also learned over the years to be cautious about accepting any view until I have heard and considered the best arguments that people on the other side of the issue have to offer. My initial efforts to find opposing views on the web did not turn up anything I found very impressive, but I am interested in what others may know.
Friday, February 1, 2008
Philosophy of traffic
In our FUSN group the question arose of whether left turn on red was ever permitted. It is, usually, when from a one-way street onto a one-way street. You can look at the Wikipedia (yay!) article titled "Right turn on red". I was intrigued by one of the later paragraphs in the article at the time I am writing this, though I imagine it may disappear because it is not very encyclopedia-ish:
"A very curious question involving legal moves under a red light signal is why it is illegal to go straight under a red light if the vehicle involved is traveling straight on the through road of a 3-way (T-shaped) intersection. ... The theory behind the legality of turning right on red or turning left on red from a one-way street onto a one-way street is obvious. It prohibits a vehicle from crossing a lane of traffic, but allows a vehicle to enter a moving lane of traffic if there are no obstacles. That theory is consistent with allowing a vehicle traveling on the through road at a 3-way (T-shaped) intersection to travel straight under a red light if it is safe to do so. In such a circumstance, the vehicle can turn no further right than going straight."
I have thought this for some time.
One legal point that intrigues me is whether turning right on red is required when it is clearly safe to do so. Drivers behind you will express their opinion, but that is a different matter. Presumably one could get a ticket for blatantly and habitually failing to go forward at a green light, but my intuition is that this is not true of turning right on red.
The social institution of right turn on red does have some undesirable effects. At some intersections, there is very rarely any traffic to wait for, and drivers who take a route repeatedly will come to count on it. They perhaps come to less than a full stop at the intersection, and then if they are surprised to see some traffic, tend to proceed anyway because they are emotionally committed to it. I interpret the law (or at least the ethics) to be that if another driver has to slow down at all, the right turn on red was not appropriate. In this it differs from a stop sign. We all know that in heavy traffic, you can't actually wait until the intersection is totally clear before turning right, because that will never happen. With right turn on red, you do know the intersection will clear because those red lights eventually turn green, however briefly.
At one important level, I believe that there is no harm in treating all red lights as stop signs, regardless of what lane you are in or what direction you are going to turn. If you really can verify that you aren't going to interfere with other traffic, it is safe, isn't it? I know that I have sometimes spent interminable minutes at a red light of some grand intersection late at night when there is not another car in sight.
At other levels it isn't a good idea. Some laws are routinely broken. Highway speed limits are a dramatic example. There are other cases where custom weakens and erodes compliance. Some of you may be familiar with the off ramp of the Weston Newton exit from the Pike. Two lanes approach the right-straight part of the intersection (a third lane for going left-straight is beyond a divider). My recollection is that in the late 1980s, everyone stopped and treated it as a true red light and did not interpret going ahead as a right turn. But over the years the situation has evolved to the point where almost all drivers not only turn right after "stopping" from the right of those two lanes but also from the left -- which I believe is not legal anywhere. I find it annoying at times when I'm in the westbound Washington Street traffic, though I have to admit that mostly it is a safe maneuver. But if proceeding in any direction from a red light became common I think it would be unsafe because it can require quite a bit of skill. Those drivers who are less skilled would feel "peer pressure" to go in situations they really cannot determine to be safe. Admittedly, negotiating traffic around Boston in many areas during peak times requires even more skill though composed entirely of fully legal maneuvers. Less confident drivers often avoid those situations, and treating all red lights as stop signs would expand the situations they would have to avoid and increase the danger when they didn't. I was intrigued to hear that the laws against drivers in the 16 to 18 year range carrying other teens are secretly a relief to some teen drivers, who really don't feel up to that sort of stress and pressure. I suspect one reason right turn on red is permitted is that it doesn't require much skill to determine whether it is safe to proceed.
Some of you may be familiar with the Newton Corner intersection where Washington Street crosses the Pike to the north, at which point going straight would lead to Galen Street. The same logic from the West Newton exit could lead to drivers in the leftmost lane stopping and then proceeding to the left, and stopping once again at the next light before heading onto the Pike westbound. I'm glad it hasn't happened (it hasn't happened, has it?).
I have sometimes pondered that there are three separate reasons to avoid questionable maneuvers in driving. It is (1) unsafe, (2) rude, or (3) specifically illegal. It is remarkable to what extent those three criteria vary independently.
"A very curious question involving legal moves under a red light signal is why it is illegal to go straight under a red light if the vehicle involved is traveling straight on the through road of a 3-way (T-shaped) intersection. ... The theory behind the legality of turning right on red or turning left on red from a one-way street onto a one-way street is obvious. It prohibits a vehicle from crossing a lane of traffic, but allows a vehicle to enter a moving lane of traffic if there are no obstacles. That theory is consistent with allowing a vehicle traveling on the through road at a 3-way (T-shaped) intersection to travel straight under a red light if it is safe to do so. In such a circumstance, the vehicle can turn no further right than going straight."
I have thought this for some time.
One legal point that intrigues me is whether turning right on red is required when it is clearly safe to do so. Drivers behind you will express their opinion, but that is a different matter. Presumably one could get a ticket for blatantly and habitually failing to go forward at a green light, but my intuition is that this is not true of turning right on red.
The social institution of right turn on red does have some undesirable effects. At some intersections, there is very rarely any traffic to wait for, and drivers who take a route repeatedly will come to count on it. They perhaps come to less than a full stop at the intersection, and then if they are surprised to see some traffic, tend to proceed anyway because they are emotionally committed to it. I interpret the law (or at least the ethics) to be that if another driver has to slow down at all, the right turn on red was not appropriate. In this it differs from a stop sign. We all know that in heavy traffic, you can't actually wait until the intersection is totally clear before turning right, because that will never happen. With right turn on red, you do know the intersection will clear because those red lights eventually turn green, however briefly.
At one important level, I believe that there is no harm in treating all red lights as stop signs, regardless of what lane you are in or what direction you are going to turn. If you really can verify that you aren't going to interfere with other traffic, it is safe, isn't it? I know that I have sometimes spent interminable minutes at a red light of some grand intersection late at night when there is not another car in sight.
At other levels it isn't a good idea. Some laws are routinely broken. Highway speed limits are a dramatic example. There are other cases where custom weakens and erodes compliance. Some of you may be familiar with the off ramp of the Weston Newton exit from the Pike. Two lanes approach the right-straight part of the intersection (a third lane for going left-straight is beyond a divider). My recollection is that in the late 1980s, everyone stopped and treated it as a true red light and did not interpret going ahead as a right turn. But over the years the situation has evolved to the point where almost all drivers not only turn right after "stopping" from the right of those two lanes but also from the left -- which I believe is not legal anywhere. I find it annoying at times when I'm in the westbound Washington Street traffic, though I have to admit that mostly it is a safe maneuver. But if proceeding in any direction from a red light became common I think it would be unsafe because it can require quite a bit of skill. Those drivers who are less skilled would feel "peer pressure" to go in situations they really cannot determine to be safe. Admittedly, negotiating traffic around Boston in many areas during peak times requires even more skill though composed entirely of fully legal maneuvers. Less confident drivers often avoid those situations, and treating all red lights as stop signs would expand the situations they would have to avoid and increase the danger when they didn't. I was intrigued to hear that the laws against drivers in the 16 to 18 year range carrying other teens are secretly a relief to some teen drivers, who really don't feel up to that sort of stress and pressure. I suspect one reason right turn on red is permitted is that it doesn't require much skill to determine whether it is safe to proceed.
Some of you may be familiar with the Newton Corner intersection where Washington Street crosses the Pike to the north, at which point going straight would lead to Galen Street. The same logic from the West Newton exit could lead to drivers in the leftmost lane stopping and then proceeding to the left, and stopping once again at the next light before heading onto the Pike westbound. I'm glad it hasn't happened (it hasn't happened, has it?).
I have sometimes pondered that there are three separate reasons to avoid questionable maneuvers in driving. It is (1) unsafe, (2) rude, or (3) specifically illegal. It is remarkable to what extent those three criteria vary independently.
Thursday, January 24, 2008
Thoughts on "The Black Swan" by Nassim Nicholas Taleb
I like this book, and agree with its main points. You can find those by searching for "Black Swan" on Wikipedia. Having said I like the book, my comments below start with a few complaints.
Complaint 1. I don't really like the analogy of the black swan from which the book takes its title. Taleb's idea is that biologists used to say that swans had to be white, and if it wasn't white, it wasn't a swan. Then a species of black swan was discovered in Australia. He claims this is an example of a new, totally unexpected event. Everyone knew that Australia existed before, so I doubt anyone was very surprised that when they studied a new place they would find a differently-colored bird. If there are swans on Alpha Centauri, I don't think we have strong predictions about what color they should be. The more surprising black swan events are ones where people believed they understood why a situation not only was a certain way but that it had to be that way. I don't think anyone claimed that there was something about whiteness that was essential to the workings of the bird -- everyone knew it was basically an accident or the result of some mundane force of natural selection. I suppose "black swan" is a pleasing image, amenable to succinct explanation, and has a few properties of what he's getting at.
Complaint 2. Taleb comes across as not very nice, and not very mature in the area of human relationships. The book is full of cheap shots and fantasies about doing bad things to the people he doesn't like. He believes experts and economists and so forth dispense worthless advice, and I bet he's pretty much right. It sounds like he has (figuratively) jumped up and down and shouted this at them for some time, and they not only don't switch careers, they become defensive or go on the attack against him. But there's nose-thumbling -- with very little compassion and very little tolerance. It's very hard to give up your career and watch your earnings plummet, and all people will go through great psychological contortions to justify keeping on as they are. The advice all the rest of us give and get is to not childishly belittle our opponents. On the other hand, he has gotten as far in spreading his message as writing a bestseller. Possibly being mean gets attention, and readers might accept his ideas once he has their attention. Ironically, he suggests in a few places that he views religion as a positive thing, but he hardly shows many religious virtues, Christian or other.
Complaint 3. At one point he describes what happens when people are asked to make estimates of some number, and give a range describing their certainty. On average people are far more confident than they should be. Perhaps 50% of the people are wrong about the number being within a range they were 90% confident it would be within. He then addresses the exceptions. Some people, he notes, will give a ridiculously wide range. If asked for a 90% confidence interval of how many lovers Catherine the Great had, they might say between zero and 10,000. He says they are just not playing the game, and they might as well say so. But there is also the possibility that they are attuned to black swans, that they are taking seriously the possibility that there is some important factor they aren't aware of or haven't considered. (Even 10,000 could be a different lover every day for 30 years). It's unfortunate to dismiss people who actually agree with his point. (None of the numbers above are from the book, but they are good enough to make the point.)
Complaint 4. He makes a key distinction in the book between "mediocristan", where things follow predictable distributions and stunning surprises don't occur (height, weight, longevity), and "extremistan", the realm of black swans (individual wealth, book sales, etc.). I think it is a valid and useful distinction. He admits at one point that for him personally, mediocristan is not very interesting, and what he values in life is in the excitement of extremistan. Self-consciously or not, this is reflected in the very terms he chose. I for one prefer to live in the more predictable realm. If I were picking terms to reflect my values I might call it "harmonistan" or "calmistan" instead of "mediocristan", and might call the other place "wackistan" or "chaoticstan" instead of "extremistan".
Observation 1. A substantial part of the evidence in the book is the failings of human reasoning and intuition, most of which I had run across recently in reading an introductory psychology textbook ("Psychology", 2004, David G. Myers). But changing the world often does involve repackaging old ideas in different ways, hoping to find one to get people's attention. The book is something of a bestseller, so it's on the right track of making these truths more widely known.
Approval 1. I did especially like his section on silent evidence, quite in line with thoughts I have had for some time (see my earlier post "When the news is bad for you"). A cute instance is his consideration of the belief among gamblers that people have beginner's luck, something a clear-thinking person would be inclined to attribute to superstition. He observes that people who started out gambling and had bad luck quite probably stopped gambling, and it was initial success that got people hooked so that they are among the peers that a gambler considers. The ones who had bad luck initially are off doing something else.
Approval 2. He denigrates the economic advice of others and repeatedly implies he has a better idea. I think he quite possibly does. His investment philosophy is buried in the book, but when he finally gets to it he easily describes it in very few words. The gist is to place most of your assets in a very safe vehicle such as T-bills. Put the rest in a variety of highly speculative ventures, because while there's only a small chance that any one of them will pay off, the one that does could give a huge benefit. He doesn't like the more conventional strategy of looking for a fairly good rate of return balanced against some risk because our estimates of the risk are way too low. Brief answers are often the best, especially when a primary contention is that other people think they know too much.
Approval 3. He notes that he grew up in Lebanon in what was a peaceful, stable place, until suddenly the entire world he knew fell apart with the civil war of 1975. He implies that some people try to dismiss his work by saying his thinking is the result of his own personal trauma. I am inclined to accept the factual gist of that observation but frame it differently. His early experience has opened him up to see unpleasant truths that most of the rest of us are not primed to see.
Approval 4. I am fully with him in one key respect. A great deal of the time, the right answer to interesting questions is: "I don't know."
Complaint 1. I don't really like the analogy of the black swan from which the book takes its title. Taleb's idea is that biologists used to say that swans had to be white, and if it wasn't white, it wasn't a swan. Then a species of black swan was discovered in Australia. He claims this is an example of a new, totally unexpected event. Everyone knew that Australia existed before, so I doubt anyone was very surprised that when they studied a new place they would find a differently-colored bird. If there are swans on Alpha Centauri, I don't think we have strong predictions about what color they should be. The more surprising black swan events are ones where people believed they understood why a situation not only was a certain way but that it had to be that way. I don't think anyone claimed that there was something about whiteness that was essential to the workings of the bird -- everyone knew it was basically an accident or the result of some mundane force of natural selection. I suppose "black swan" is a pleasing image, amenable to succinct explanation, and has a few properties of what he's getting at.
Complaint 2. Taleb comes across as not very nice, and not very mature in the area of human relationships. The book is full of cheap shots and fantasies about doing bad things to the people he doesn't like. He believes experts and economists and so forth dispense worthless advice, and I bet he's pretty much right. It sounds like he has (figuratively) jumped up and down and shouted this at them for some time, and they not only don't switch careers, they become defensive or go on the attack against him. But there's nose-thumbling -- with very little compassion and very little tolerance. It's very hard to give up your career and watch your earnings plummet, and all people will go through great psychological contortions to justify keeping on as they are. The advice all the rest of us give and get is to not childishly belittle our opponents. On the other hand, he has gotten as far in spreading his message as writing a bestseller. Possibly being mean gets attention, and readers might accept his ideas once he has their attention. Ironically, he suggests in a few places that he views religion as a positive thing, but he hardly shows many religious virtues, Christian or other.
Complaint 3. At one point he describes what happens when people are asked to make estimates of some number, and give a range describing their certainty. On average people are far more confident than they should be. Perhaps 50% of the people are wrong about the number being within a range they were 90% confident it would be within. He then addresses the exceptions. Some people, he notes, will give a ridiculously wide range. If asked for a 90% confidence interval of how many lovers Catherine the Great had, they might say between zero and 10,000. He says they are just not playing the game, and they might as well say so. But there is also the possibility that they are attuned to black swans, that they are taking seriously the possibility that there is some important factor they aren't aware of or haven't considered. (Even 10,000 could be a different lover every day for 30 years). It's unfortunate to dismiss people who actually agree with his point. (None of the numbers above are from the book, but they are good enough to make the point.)
Complaint 4. He makes a key distinction in the book between "mediocristan", where things follow predictable distributions and stunning surprises don't occur (height, weight, longevity), and "extremistan", the realm of black swans (individual wealth, book sales, etc.). I think it is a valid and useful distinction. He admits at one point that for him personally, mediocristan is not very interesting, and what he values in life is in the excitement of extremistan. Self-consciously or not, this is reflected in the very terms he chose. I for one prefer to live in the more predictable realm. If I were picking terms to reflect my values I might call it "harmonistan" or "calmistan" instead of "mediocristan", and might call the other place "wackistan" or "chaoticstan" instead of "extremistan".
Observation 1. A substantial part of the evidence in the book is the failings of human reasoning and intuition, most of which I had run across recently in reading an introductory psychology textbook ("Psychology", 2004, David G. Myers). But changing the world often does involve repackaging old ideas in different ways, hoping to find one to get people's attention. The book is something of a bestseller, so it's on the right track of making these truths more widely known.
Approval 1. I did especially like his section on silent evidence, quite in line with thoughts I have had for some time (see my earlier post "When the news is bad for you"). A cute instance is his consideration of the belief among gamblers that people have beginner's luck, something a clear-thinking person would be inclined to attribute to superstition. He observes that people who started out gambling and had bad luck quite probably stopped gambling, and it was initial success that got people hooked so that they are among the peers that a gambler considers. The ones who had bad luck initially are off doing something else.
Approval 2. He denigrates the economic advice of others and repeatedly implies he has a better idea. I think he quite possibly does. His investment philosophy is buried in the book, but when he finally gets to it he easily describes it in very few words. The gist is to place most of your assets in a very safe vehicle such as T-bills. Put the rest in a variety of highly speculative ventures, because while there's only a small chance that any one of them will pay off, the one that does could give a huge benefit. He doesn't like the more conventional strategy of looking for a fairly good rate of return balanced against some risk because our estimates of the risk are way too low. Brief answers are often the best, especially when a primary contention is that other people think they know too much.
Approval 3. He notes that he grew up in Lebanon in what was a peaceful, stable place, until suddenly the entire world he knew fell apart with the civil war of 1975. He implies that some people try to dismiss his work by saying his thinking is the result of his own personal trauma. I am inclined to accept the factual gist of that observation but frame it differently. His early experience has opened him up to see unpleasant truths that most of the rest of us are not primed to see.
Approval 4. I am fully with him in one key respect. A great deal of the time, the right answer to interesting questions is: "I don't know."
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Good enough
I read an interesting book within the past couple years called "The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less", by Barry Schwartz. I realize that it has actually had some influence on how I live my life, which is rare for a book.
When we face a problem, there are two ways to approach it: As an "optimizer", who seeks the best solution, and as a "satisficer", who seeks a solution that is good enough. Many of us, much of the time, feel obligated to optimize, by educating ourselves on the alternatives, reviewing them thoroughly, and choosing the best one according to our criteria. To the extent we fail, we feel guilty. Other people may let us know that we missed some great bargain, or the even better restaurant, and we cooperate with them in feeling that we failed.
It's worth optimizing about the big things in life: what city to live in, what house to buy, what job to take. It is worth optimizing money when it concerns large amounts -- bargaining carefully for the best price on your home or the best salary at your job. We can sometimes regret not having devoted as much attention to these questions as we should.
But for the less important aspects of life you can often find a solution that is good enough.
Consider driving to an event in a city where parking is an issue and you may have to park at some distance from the event. The density of cars parked beside the road increases as you near the event, but there are other reasons than your event for local concentrations of cars. You can't see by peering ahead where the last space is you could park in (think fire hydrants, driveways). You are likely to go just a little farther. Often you get it pretty much right. Less often you find you have passed the last available space and need to turn around and go back to those spaces you passed. Often when you get there the previously closest space is taken and you have to go back a little bit farther. This is frustrating. The satisficing solution is to park at the first space that is good enough, and not let yourself feel incompetent if as you walk towards the event you see an empty space that was significantly closer. You may have saved yourself the possible frustration of having to turn around. More importantly, you have saved time of your life spent looking for a parking space. You could be walking instead, something we generally find inherently more relaxing and in line with our values. This is especially relevant if you are the sort of person who regularly runs several miles for exercise.
Consider driving with a friend to a place you have never been before and will probably never go again. You know one way to go, but there might be a better way. You can study a map for some time, determine the route you want, and spend your trip verifying you are following the path you have charted. Or you could spend the entirety of a slightly longer trip talking with your friend.
At the supermarket you can look at the different brands and different package sizes and spend considerable time finding the best buy. Or you can just pick one and spend less of your life in the activity known as shopping.
When you vacuum your house you can dig into every corner, every time, and chase every last bit of dust. Or you might reflect that within a day or so the natural accumulation of dirt will have rendered the benefit of your more thorough cleaning imperceptible. The goal could shift from having a house that is (periodically) "extremely clean", to having one that is "not very dirty", or in other words "good enough".
Now, for all the caveats:
For some people, optimization habits are just a part of the fabric of their life and define "how one ought to live".
Successful optimization shows competence and mastery, and for many people such opportunities are not abundant.
Some people just really enjoy shopping, including getting the best deal on small items. Some inherently enjoy feeling that their house is extraordinarily clean, even if briefly. Enjoyment is good.
Finding the best route to a particular destination could increase one's knowledge of the lay of the land, allowing faster trips when time really is important.
Sometimes it really is important to optimize on even small amounts of money, since they do add up. But it might be prudent to look at one's budget as a whole to see where larger amounts of money are at stake. You could feel that you are living a frugal life by checking out the brands, whereas ten times that amount of money is at stake in what you might have to admit are luxuries if you were forced to think about it.
For some people, it may be hard to make a mix of optimizing and satisficing decisions. Perhaps they are not only on a tight budget, but if they relaxed their buying habits in one area of life it might spread to areas that are more important. My mother, a child of the depression, sometimes washed lettuce by using a small stream of water and shutting it off after finishing each leaf before picking up the next one, though I don't think water was ever expensive or in short supply in her life. But it was part of an attitude of frugality.
There can also be an instance of the "free rider" problem. If few people were engaged in careful comparison shopping, the stores could gradually raise their prices. Being confident that all prices are "good enough" depends on optimizers who do pay attention to which store has milk that is five cents cheaper. People who carefully compare prices are doing a service for the rest of us, even if as individuals it may not be in their immediate self-interest to do so. I wonder sometimes to what extent Whole Foods is an entire chain built on customers who are satisficers with regard to price. I'm not actually feeling guilty about the "free rider" problem, since there is no looming shortage of comparison shoppers.
The next step is to be willing to go public: tell your friends that you aren't troubled that you spent a few extra dollars on something because it's not a priority for you. What you paid was good enough.
When we face a problem, there are two ways to approach it: As an "optimizer", who seeks the best solution, and as a "satisficer", who seeks a solution that is good enough. Many of us, much of the time, feel obligated to optimize, by educating ourselves on the alternatives, reviewing them thoroughly, and choosing the best one according to our criteria. To the extent we fail, we feel guilty. Other people may let us know that we missed some great bargain, or the even better restaurant, and we cooperate with them in feeling that we failed.
It's worth optimizing about the big things in life: what city to live in, what house to buy, what job to take. It is worth optimizing money when it concerns large amounts -- bargaining carefully for the best price on your home or the best salary at your job. We can sometimes regret not having devoted as much attention to these questions as we should.
But for the less important aspects of life you can often find a solution that is good enough.
Consider driving to an event in a city where parking is an issue and you may have to park at some distance from the event. The density of cars parked beside the road increases as you near the event, but there are other reasons than your event for local concentrations of cars. You can't see by peering ahead where the last space is you could park in (think fire hydrants, driveways). You are likely to go just a little farther. Often you get it pretty much right. Less often you find you have passed the last available space and need to turn around and go back to those spaces you passed. Often when you get there the previously closest space is taken and you have to go back a little bit farther. This is frustrating. The satisficing solution is to park at the first space that is good enough, and not let yourself feel incompetent if as you walk towards the event you see an empty space that was significantly closer. You may have saved yourself the possible frustration of having to turn around. More importantly, you have saved time of your life spent looking for a parking space. You could be walking instead, something we generally find inherently more relaxing and in line with our values. This is especially relevant if you are the sort of person who regularly runs several miles for exercise.
Consider driving with a friend to a place you have never been before and will probably never go again. You know one way to go, but there might be a better way. You can study a map for some time, determine the route you want, and spend your trip verifying you are following the path you have charted. Or you could spend the entirety of a slightly longer trip talking with your friend.
At the supermarket you can look at the different brands and different package sizes and spend considerable time finding the best buy. Or you can just pick one and spend less of your life in the activity known as shopping.
When you vacuum your house you can dig into every corner, every time, and chase every last bit of dust. Or you might reflect that within a day or so the natural accumulation of dirt will have rendered the benefit of your more thorough cleaning imperceptible. The goal could shift from having a house that is (periodically) "extremely clean", to having one that is "not very dirty", or in other words "good enough".
Now, for all the caveats:
For some people, optimization habits are just a part of the fabric of their life and define "how one ought to live".
Successful optimization shows competence and mastery, and for many people such opportunities are not abundant.
Some people just really enjoy shopping, including getting the best deal on small items. Some inherently enjoy feeling that their house is extraordinarily clean, even if briefly. Enjoyment is good.
Finding the best route to a particular destination could increase one's knowledge of the lay of the land, allowing faster trips when time really is important.
Sometimes it really is important to optimize on even small amounts of money, since they do add up. But it might be prudent to look at one's budget as a whole to see where larger amounts of money are at stake. You could feel that you are living a frugal life by checking out the brands, whereas ten times that amount of money is at stake in what you might have to admit are luxuries if you were forced to think about it.
For some people, it may be hard to make a mix of optimizing and satisficing decisions. Perhaps they are not only on a tight budget, but if they relaxed their buying habits in one area of life it might spread to areas that are more important. My mother, a child of the depression, sometimes washed lettuce by using a small stream of water and shutting it off after finishing each leaf before picking up the next one, though I don't think water was ever expensive or in short supply in her life. But it was part of an attitude of frugality.
There can also be an instance of the "free rider" problem. If few people were engaged in careful comparison shopping, the stores could gradually raise their prices. Being confident that all prices are "good enough" depends on optimizers who do pay attention to which store has milk that is five cents cheaper. People who carefully compare prices are doing a service for the rest of us, even if as individuals it may not be in their immediate self-interest to do so. I wonder sometimes to what extent Whole Foods is an entire chain built on customers who are satisficers with regard to price. I'm not actually feeling guilty about the "free rider" problem, since there is no looming shortage of comparison shoppers.
The next step is to be willing to go public: tell your friends that you aren't troubled that you spent a few extra dollars on something because it's not a priority for you. What you paid was good enough.
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
How to treat the terminally unconscious
How should we treat a person who is terminally ill and terminally unconscious? For people who believe in an afterlife, considerable attention makes sense, since some sort of essence of the person remains until the time of death before moving on in some fashion. Even for some who don't believe in an afterlife, special attention makes sense as part of customs or traditions.
What about those who don't believe in an afterlife and have no reason within their family customs to give special attention to an unconscious dying person? What do they owe ethically or morally to the unconscious dying person as a person? Beyond basic physical comfort, I suggest the answer is: nothing.
I think large parts of our society do not accept this as a valid position. This was driven home to me when my mother died in November. She was in the hospital on what everyone knew would be her last day. She was profoundly unconscious, not responding to music, voices, or touch. When she was conscious in the few days before that, she had given no sign of recognizing individual family members. She had had a progressive and serious dementia for the past two years.
My father had decided that he did not want to be there on her last day, based on his understanding of the situation. If he thought she would recognize him and he could be of some comfort to her, no one could have kept him away. But he was certain this was not true, so he did not want to go.
In the nursing facility where he lives, a nurse essentially bullied him until he agreed to go to the hospital. Perhaps "bullying" is a strong word, but it had that effect on a man who was frail, grieving, and under the best of circumstances shies away from conflict. She told him that my mother could hear him even if she couldn't respond and that he would regret it later if he didn't go. She would not accept repeated "No thanks" or "I'll think about it". Hopefully most people will agree that she went too far, but I think far too many people believe that she was right. He went to my mother's bedside for an hour or two, but found it an upsetting experience without any benefit.
My father has since expressed dismay that family members were summoned to her bedside at a time when she was terminally unconscious. He feels it was gruesome and disrespectful. I don't share his feeling that it was gruesome or disrespectful to her, though if I had known I would have tried to respect his wishes. I do share his feeling that there was no benefit to her from anyone being there -- for all intents and purposes there was no "her" to benefit from anything any more. He had not been present when his own mother died, and when asked if he regretted that, his answer was an unhesitating "No".
My mother never wavered from atheism in her long life. Her will stated her body was to be cremated in the least expensive manner possible. My father has been an atheist since he was in college and has been quite sure there is no afterlife. There is no doubt in my mind that my father loved my mother as much as one person can love another. It is just his view that when her mind was fully gone, she was gone.
Why is this not acceptable? I can think of various reasons why those who believe in an afterlife would have difficulty with this view. As an aside, the staff took some time alone with my mother to tend to her physical needs just a couple hours before she died, and when they were done the small TV on its swinging arm was against the wall, at a discrete distance and a discrete volume, tuned to a Catholic mass. I personally didn't mind.
There are many people at FUSN who like me might say they believe in something unknown to science, or in a connected web of all existence, or some similar sense of spirit. But I think relatively few would say they believe in an afterlife where a person's personality and memories are preserved. I think that at a moment of contemplating a loved one's death it is understandable to waver from that conviction, and to be open to the possibility of something profound and spiritual going on in a literal sense. Some might consciously or not find themselves acting on a variant of Pascal's wager: if I behave as if this person has a soul and is present to the end, there is nothing lost in any event but much to be gained on the off chance there is.
What I ask is for respect for those of us who feel confident that nothing spiritually momentous is happening at the end of life for a person who is unconscious. That respect should include not assuming we are unloving or cowardly or in denial.
What about those who don't believe in an afterlife and have no reason within their family customs to give special attention to an unconscious dying person? What do they owe ethically or morally to the unconscious dying person as a person? Beyond basic physical comfort, I suggest the answer is: nothing.
I think large parts of our society do not accept this as a valid position. This was driven home to me when my mother died in November. She was in the hospital on what everyone knew would be her last day. She was profoundly unconscious, not responding to music, voices, or touch. When she was conscious in the few days before that, she had given no sign of recognizing individual family members. She had had a progressive and serious dementia for the past two years.
My father had decided that he did not want to be there on her last day, based on his understanding of the situation. If he thought she would recognize him and he could be of some comfort to her, no one could have kept him away. But he was certain this was not true, so he did not want to go.
In the nursing facility where he lives, a nurse essentially bullied him until he agreed to go to the hospital. Perhaps "bullying" is a strong word, but it had that effect on a man who was frail, grieving, and under the best of circumstances shies away from conflict. She told him that my mother could hear him even if she couldn't respond and that he would regret it later if he didn't go. She would not accept repeated "No thanks" or "I'll think about it". Hopefully most people will agree that she went too far, but I think far too many people believe that she was right. He went to my mother's bedside for an hour or two, but found it an upsetting experience without any benefit.
My father has since expressed dismay that family members were summoned to her bedside at a time when she was terminally unconscious. He feels it was gruesome and disrespectful. I don't share his feeling that it was gruesome or disrespectful to her, though if I had known I would have tried to respect his wishes. I do share his feeling that there was no benefit to her from anyone being there -- for all intents and purposes there was no "her" to benefit from anything any more. He had not been present when his own mother died, and when asked if he regretted that, his answer was an unhesitating "No".
My mother never wavered from atheism in her long life. Her will stated her body was to be cremated in the least expensive manner possible. My father has been an atheist since he was in college and has been quite sure there is no afterlife. There is no doubt in my mind that my father loved my mother as much as one person can love another. It is just his view that when her mind was fully gone, she was gone.
Why is this not acceptable? I can think of various reasons why those who believe in an afterlife would have difficulty with this view. As an aside, the staff took some time alone with my mother to tend to her physical needs just a couple hours before she died, and when they were done the small TV on its swinging arm was against the wall, at a discrete distance and a discrete volume, tuned to a Catholic mass. I personally didn't mind.
There are many people at FUSN who like me might say they believe in something unknown to science, or in a connected web of all existence, or some similar sense of spirit. But I think relatively few would say they believe in an afterlife where a person's personality and memories are preserved. I think that at a moment of contemplating a loved one's death it is understandable to waver from that conviction, and to be open to the possibility of something profound and spiritual going on in a literal sense. Some might consciously or not find themselves acting on a variant of Pascal's wager: if I behave as if this person has a soul and is present to the end, there is nothing lost in any event but much to be gained on the off chance there is.
What I ask is for respect for those of us who feel confident that nothing spiritually momentous is happening at the end of life for a person who is unconscious. That respect should include not assuming we are unloving or cowardly or in denial.
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